What are the disadvantages of moral science

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1Nietzsche is famous and notorious for his moral criticism. He stylizes himself as an immoralist, as someone who does not value morality, and does so to expose the self-righteousness of the moralists, who in turn is morally objectionable. Since Nietzsche it has been easier to criticize not only a certain morality, but morality as such, to subject it to philosophical criticism, criticism not as a rebuke or rejection of morality, but in Kant's sense as a limitation of its claim to general ones Validity.

2Nietzsche formulated his philosophical critique of morality as a question of the “value of morality” (GM, Preface 5), making use of the double meaning of the term 'value': on the one hand as a moral value or value in itself and on the other hand as an economic value or value for other. With the question of the moral value of morality, morality by itself is called into question. According to Nietzsche, it is a question of morality “out of morality” (M, Preface 4). Is morality, the question is asked here, tenable by its own standards? Could morality, as good as it appears, also be harmful, in the short or long term? Nietzsche gives three things to consider:

  1. With its claim to generality, morality “generalizes” individuals - but also “generalizes” them (FW 354), forcing them to adapt to one another, leveling them out.
  2. With its (ostensibly) universally valid values ​​and norms, it relieves individuals of their own responsibility and lets them become self-righteous in the pride of being justified.
  3. With her offer of general self-justification she invites to acting, to insincerity, to dishonesty.

3If one does not, however, from the outset assume comfort and mendacity to moral people, one has to ask why they follow a morality or what for and whom morality serves, and deeper still, and so Nietzsche asks what misery morality arises and remedies, or what it is for whom makes 'necessary'. This is the economic question about the meaning of morality for life. It is not easy to answer. Morality, if it arises from vital needs, could just conceal these vital needs, and moral sciences and moral philosophies dedicated to them could, according to Nietzsche, still be their “work and toys” (Za I, From the despisers of the body) and that Conceal only reinforce. Because sciences, like morality, make a claim to general validity, and it could, according to Nietzsche, be precisely this claim that eases the need, the need that could be at the root of all needs, the need to stand alone in life to be self-dependent and powerless against more powerful. For morality and science, however, there are no more powerful ones, they offer themselves precisely to be equally insightful for everyone and therefore also apply equally to everyone, and therefore one can fight against power with morality and science, fight against power, if one has in them a remedy for one's impotence in life. The more that succeeds, one can forget the power relations in life or, with Freud, repress it.1 Science presupposes the freedom of insight into generally valid contexts, morality the freedom to decide in favor of a generally valid good and against the advantages of one's own power . With a scientifically founded morality, one can force others to renounce their power, any kind of superiority.

4But why do you want this, why does someone want this? Because power is also valued: wherever it creates and maintains a general order, and we all need general order for our own life, because otherwise our lives would be too endangered, too adventurous. Morality therefore not only has a moral value in itself, but also an economic value for life; it serves to preserve weaker life against stronger life. But by receiving weaker life at the expense of stronger life, on the one hand it exercises power itself and on the other, Nietzsche worried that it would weaken life as a whole in the long term. The advantage of morality for the life of the weaker is its disadvantage for life in general, and that is why, if life is to be preserved, it has to limit the effect of morality on its part - and it does so.

5This is, in broad outline, the concept of morality and moral criticism that Nietzsche endorsed humanly, all-to-humanly elaborated and especially in the Dawn, the Cheerful science, in Beyond Good and Evil and in On the genealogy of morals deepened and condensed. For some time, however, Nietzsche research has increasingly been investigating the other side of Nietzsche's moral criticism, morality or morality, out of which Nietzsche criticizes morality for the sake of life. If you attack morality from the outside, you are simply declared immoral, an immoralist, and thus excluded from the debate, remains ineffective and only harms yourself - Nietzsche counted on it and played with it. But by showing that morality competes against power in order to win power even for the powerless, he subjected it to criticism from within and convicted it of a self-contradiction, which it has to face for moral reasons - or must, because also She can of course reject this criticism as immoral or simply ignore it. If it accepts the criticism, it has to rethink itself - as self-critical morality, as morality that knows that it can always act as immorality. It then becomes a morality of the second order, a morality in dealing with morality, and this morality in dealing with morals is then no longer fixed on itself, but can also allow other morals to apply alongside it.2 It reckons that everyone In weak situations, a universal moral may be needed to show strength, but not everyone has the same moral and not everyone in every situation and not to the same degree in every situation. Instead, everyone will need a (more or less) different morality according to their living conditions, which should apply generally according to them, and this also makes the endless dispute of moral philosophers understandable about which then should be the generally applicable morality and its generally applicable justification . Morality regularly claims general validity, but it is always individuals who claim it, and in their different living conditions they claim it for different morals. Morality is always assumed in communication, but when it comes up, nothing is as controversial as morality. With the quarrel, however, power comes back into play and the self-contradiction of morality becomes apparent. Morality in dealing with morality, which includes freedoms vis-à-vis one's own morality and for other morals, will be called ethics in the following, to have a simple term for it, and Nietzsche's ethics is an ethic of freedom for other morals, it guides his Moral criticism.

6Ethics as the science of freedom for other morals, which knows about its dependence on special living conditions and current situations, is, according to Nietzsche, a “happy science”, a slightly flexible science that does justice to the other and so, in the sense of the “gaya scienza” “The Provençal troubadours, also courageous and unselfishly loving ethical orientation.3Happy science is a programmatic title. With the book of aphorisms, which Nietzsche called it, it also has a special reason. His first IV books appeared in 1882 after the Dawn and before Thus spoke zarathustra - the end of Book IV (FW 342) is also the beginning of Thus spoke zarathustra - Nietzsche added the V book five years later, in 1887, after he had successively read the four parts of Thus spoke zarathustra and for its "explanation" Beyond Good and Evil had published and before he On the genealogy of morals wrote down the first of his increasingly polemical writings that characterize his late work and those with The antichrist shut down. The V book of the Cheerful science Seems to me to be Nietzsche's most mature work, a serene sum of his enlightened thinking - the famous "teachings" from Thus spoke zarathustra rarely appear in it. Nietzsche is also assuming the “greatest recent event”, “that 'God is dead', that belief in Christian God has become implausible” (FW 343, KSA 3.573), and thus from “ Nihilism ”(FW 347), and once, but rather incidentally, it refers to the“ will to power ”(FW 349). However, he does not fall back on the teachings of the “superman” and the “eternal return of the same”. They seem to him, as he did in his famous Lenzer Heide draft of June 10, 1887, shortly after the completion of Book V of the Cheerful science noted that they were “extreme beliefs” which “the strongest” are not “necessary” - for him these are “the most moderate”, who “represent the attained strength of man with conscious pride” (Nachlass 1887, 5 [71 ], KSA 12.217) .4

7Soon after, in On the genealogy of morals (II 2), he will call this type of the one who is mighty through his temperance “the autonomous supra-moral individual” or “the sovereign individual” for short, who can “promise” and “take responsibility” for his promises - in the awareness of his “rare freedom” and his own “Power over oneself” and without appeal to a generally applicable morality. The aphorisms of the V book of the Cheerful science, which usually grow into small treatises, are consequently arranged. Under the auspices of happiness they draw the bow from the hardship of morals to the freedom of ethics. They are the contexts of life and the context of Nietzsche's moral criticism and ethics and should all be taken into account here.5 But we have to concentrate here on the baseline, which is still complex enough. We can distinguish between three large sections that correspond exactly to our topic:

814.1 The plight of morality,

914.2 Liberation from the old morality,

1014.3 The freedom for other and new morals.

11With the 'Death of God', Nietzsche opens Book V of the Cheerful science, the morality that was built on God in Europe is no longer a matter of course, the “old world” is becoming “stranger”. It is now facing a “long abundance and succession of demolition, destruction, downfall, overthrow”, the foretaste of which the 20th century actually gave. But first, according to Nietzsche, something like “light, happiness, relief, amusement, encouragement, dawn” comes over those who know and “gratitude, astonishment, hunch, expectation - finally the horizon appears free again, […] every venture Those who know are allowed again, the sea, our The sea is open again, perhaps there has never been such an 'open sea'. ”According to Nietzsche, the historical event“ that belief in the Christian God has become implausible ”(FW 343) has new conditions for moral criticism and knowledge created at all. God was the eternal God, and with him eternity and timelessness now had its time. The knowledge that Hegel had already expressed that all knowledge has its time has now become irrefutable, especially according to Darwin's theory of evolution. For Nietzsche, despite all the criticism of Darwinism in detail, 6 it is self-evident that all life, and with it all knowledge, is tied to the circumstances of the time, to changing living conditions and is therefore perspective, and that makes all the insistence on timelessness unbelievable. One can now ask and also ask how the belief in God came about, who has now become implausible, what the living conditions were at that time and how they have changed in the meantime. Morality acts as a compulsion to act against one's own interests under one's own living conditions or, as Kant said, against one's inclinations, e.g., as the old commandments said, not to lie, steal or commit marriage if one benefits from it would have or one 'just feels like it'; the gospel continues to increase selflessly to stand up for others, to accept injustice against oneself and to love one's enemies. Morality acts as coercion only when its authority is beyond doubt, for Christianity that is, through faith in God and his Son, who died for his gospel. Both messages, however, were thought to be eternal, timeless, and when asked about their origin and thus also about the origin of the morality based on them, their authority collapses. Authority consists precisely in that Not according to their origin, Not the time that conditioned it - an authority for a time is not an authority.

But now God is not simply dead - the 'death of God' is not simply a truth, and Nietzsche puts it in quotation marks. It is the death of a belief, and this death, in turn, cannot be more than a belief. So faith did not die. Nietzsche is very aware of this, and he draws a strong conclusion from it. After that, the Enlightenment, the Enlightenment, which replaced the truth of faith with the truth of science and claims the death of God from it, still believes in the truth, and this belief, too, owed its time and could now as well have had their time - “and with this”, so Nietzsche, “we are on the ground of morality.” Because why, he asks, do you want truth, why do you want to believe in the truth? Also truth, that, it is so ‘, should be timeless, what is true should be true now and always, the truth of belief and the truth of science share the belief in timelessness. But whoever wants timeless truth and believes in it, “affirms another world than that of life, nature and history”, another than “our world”, in which there is no timeless truth (FW 344). Such is the need that not only compels morality and religion, but also to believe in the truth, ultimately the time in which everything can change. It compels us to get rid of time and to something that is timelessly valid, and thus it compels individuals to act against their interests or inclinations, provided that these interests and inclinations can be different for everyone and at any time. Morality as the basis of religion and science as well compels individuals to make themselves general and timeless, to de-individualize themselves.

In this sense, according to Nietzsche, morality has never been made a serious problem; no “criticism” of morality has ever questioned its meaning and value for life. Morality, it means, had so far had such great authority that the Enlightenment did not dare to approach it either. Man wanted morality and therefore always assumed its necessity, and to this day the dispute is only about what its essence is to be seen in and how it can best be justified - all thinking was and is visibly already under the spell of morality and can do not turn against them at all. In order to be able to turn against the need that compels morality, one must, according to Nietzsche, be in a "need", the need to suffer from its effects in such a way that one is again compelled to question it . As he writes, it was “his personal hardship” to have to make morality a problem, and he found it to be his “torment”, but also his “lust” and “passion”. So he did not re-pose the problem of morality (and thus self-contradictory) as a general one, but as his own, and he did not offer a generally valid solution either, but only his Solution, which in turn can only be understood by those who share their needs or are willing to share (FW 345). Nietzsche immediately adds: "It will be difficult to understand us." (FW 346)

14Most people will not get involved and cannot get involved because most of the time they have a “need for faith” (FW 347), and because they have it, most “in old Europe” still have it today Christianity, be it a metaphysics "necessary". In both, a “desire” lives on, “to want something firmly”, a “desire for hold, support, [which] does not create religions, metaphysics, and convictions of all kinds, but - preserves.” Capable of criticizing morality are only those who do not have this desire, or at least less and less often, who need fewer authorities, because they are authorities for themselves. Nietzsche does not say that there is such a person. He just says it

a pleasure and power of self-determination, a freedom of will, would be conceivable, in which a spirit bids farewell to every belief, every desire for certainty, practiced as it is, being able to hold on to easy ropes and possibilities and even close to abysses to dance. Such a spirit would be the free spirit par excellence. (FW347)

For Nietzsche, however, the “emergency situation” is not the basic feature of life; Just as life shows itself in all its abundance as plant and animal life, it is rather "the abundance, the waste, even into the nonsensical" (FW 349). There are needs of human Life, which necessitate morality and - at least Nietzsche - also a critique of morality. The morality, of which Europeans are so proud that they believe they have to spread it all over the world, must therefore have human-all-too-human origins, must be "an expression of an emergency" in which they had to "maintain themselves" ( FW 349), and morale could be maintained, but the emergency situation has long since changed. In order to discover what that emergency was at that time, Nietzsche then has his Genealogy of Morals in which he historically traced the Greek and Judeo-Christian and systematically the economic and psychological origins of European morality, their tensions among themselves and the upheavals that resulted from them, and the further developments under changing conditions. However, he already had the basic distinction in Beyond Good and Evil (JGB 257 ff.) And in the fifth book of Cheerful science (FW 370) developed: that of an "elegant way of valuing" that comes from the "excess of life" and one "indecent" that comes from the "impoverishment of life" (FW 370), and it provokes the distinction between " Master and slave morals "sharpened. For him, “noble” is an ethical term beyond all social classes and means, as we still use the term today, to be able to forego retaliation and thus reciprocity, to be able to do good to others without expecting the same from them. But this is only possible from an “overabundance of life”, not in its “impoverishment”; the more someone is in need and suffers from it, the harder it is for him to prove himself noble. In Europe, however, the unpleasant valuation, the insistence on equality and reciprocity, i.e. a morality that is the same for all and for all time, has prevailed, and the result of this "revaluation" are the "modern ideas" - in a list that Nietzsche himself Created in 1888, he names, among other things, "freedom", equality of rights, "humanity", "the people", "the race", "the nation", "democracy," tolerance "," the milieu "," women emancipation " , “Volks-Bildung”, “Progress”, “Sociologie” (estate 1888, 16 [82], KSA 13.514). These ideas, however, are "wrong" insofar as they permanently restrict new developments in life, and the more wrong the easier life in Europe has become with the help of modern technology and medicine. With them a new time could have come, in which the old “moral interpretation” is no longer “so necessary” for not just a few (Nachlass 1887, 5 [71], KSA 12.212), a time in which one of the to say goodbye to fearful and envious equality and mutual morality. A morality that demands equality and reciprocity in one's own interest is, according to Nietzsche, an indictment of poverty. So far, however, it has been the Europeans hardly dispensable ”: they would have used the“ disguise under moral formulas and concepts of decency, the whole benevolent hiding of our actions under the concepts of duty, virtue, public spirit, honesty, self-denial ”like a“ masquerade ”, like a“ disguise ”, theirs hide unsightly nudity (FW 352). And it is not strength, but weakness that disguises itself:

It is not the fearfulness of the predator that finds a moral disguise necessary, but the herd animal with its deep mediocrity, fear and boredom in itself. Morality cleans up the European - let's admit it! - in it’s more noble, more important, more respectable, in’s, divine ‘- (FW 352)

16The tendency towards “generalized”, “generalized” valuation has, however, deep reasons that go beyond the historical. As Nietzsche shows in the outstanding Aphorism No. 354, they lie in consciousness itself. He suspects there that consciousness arose and grew with the need for communication - one becomes aware of what is communicated to others at the risk of misunderstanding. The need for communication, however, serves the “species” and thus the “herd perspective”, all “communication signs” are invented and handed down for them. But this means that only that which serves the mutual understanding, not the individually experienced and experienced is conscious and communicable: The consciousness is “only finely developed in relation to community and herd usefulness”, and so is

consequently each of us, with the best will to understand oneself as individually as possible, to know oneself ', but always only bring to consciousness the non-individual in oneself […], one's' average', […] our thought itself [is] continually dominated by the character of consciousness - through the 'genius of the genus' which rules in it - and translated back into the herd perspective (FW 354).

17After this, all consciousness is moralized through and through in the sense of equality and reciprocity. In the following Aphorism No. 355 Nietzsche adds that all knowledge also follows the principle of fearfulness, provided that it seeks to trace everything that is disturbing foreign to what is reassuringly familiar. Both of these factors make philosophers who evade human needs in order to surrender to pure thought, susceptible to morality of equality and reciprocity. It becomes their “hiding place”, a hiding place from the “spirit” of the vitality of life and its ever new possibilities (FW 359).

18But with the "death of God" new possibilities of philosophizing opened up and vice versa: new possibilities of philosophizing brought about the "death of God". The "Christian morality", so Nietzsche in aphorism no. 357 (at the end of On the genealogy of morals he will quote the passage again), has canceled itself in that "the increasingly strict concept of truthfulness, the confessor's delicacy of the Christian conscience, has been translated and sublimated to a scientific conscience, to intellectual cleanliness at all costs", and precisely therein lay “Europe's longest and bravest self-conquest”. Morality of Christian origin compels itself to self-criticism, they can cannot or will not be able to remain with generalization and generalization morality. But initially there will be only a few and individuals who will face this and the more they will be able to face it, the more they, like Nietzsche, the pastor's son, have themselves been impregnated by Christian morality. Nietzsche relies on "hermits", "cynics", "homeless" and "wanderers" (he was all of that himself), who have withdrawn from communities that are mutually committed, and offers them something like a cheerful basic course to learn to endure hard-to-digest people. He recommends self-conquering practices, and they go to the point of high spirits: “stuffing down” involuntary dislikes, praising others so that they begin to “sweat out their happiness”, and “self-hypnotization” for so long that they become "Patience" becomes (FW 364). Such coincidences into the inevitable, however, should, what they are anyway, remain masquerades, through which one can protect one's other, one's own, individual, through which one becomes a "ghost": "one reaches for us and cannot get hold of us" (FW 365). The “cynic” recommends listening to his body instead of moral compulsion, whether he - the example here is Wagner's music - easily goes along or “revolts” (FW 368). On the whole one behaves best like artists who, by necessity, “stand for themselves in a strange way, stand for themselves and have growth for themselves - I want to say quite different degrees and speeds of old, young, mature, Crumbly, lazy ”(FW 369). And to the extent that art, like the Wagnerians, needs metaphysics for its part, one can “perhaps with Rubens” to the “dithyrambic”, with Hafez to the “blessed and mocking”, with Goethe to the “bright and benevolent” and with Homer adhere to the "light and halo shine over all things" art (FW 370). One should not complain about being “misunderstood, misunderstood, confused, slandered, interrogated and ignored”, but rather understand this as an “award” for the time being, as long as one is still “constantly changing” and “shedding old bark” (FW 371). It liberates us not to “idealistically” ignore the “music of life” that opens up beyond the “communication signs” that serve for communalization (FW 372), to accept the “ambiguous” and “perspective character of existence”, to be arithmetic To be wary of “world interpretations” and instead engage in “infinite interpretations” (FW 373 and 374). The Epicureans have remained cautious “against final convictions”, have “let the question mark character of things not be easy to buy”, and have retained their “aversion to the great moral words and gestures” (FW 375). Like artists, one has to be ready and ripe for death for every success (FW 376).

According to Nietzsche, those who are “homeless” in terms of morality are the “children of the future” because they “still feel at home even in this fragile, broken transitional period” and can therefore survive them strengthened. Anyone who is not at home in order will be even more reluctant to “speak out against nationalism and racial hatred” and most likely be able to think “about the necessity of new orders”, even unheard of, “including a new slavery” for those who cannot and do not want to live without the guarantee of fixed regulations, without all-round insurance (all-round insurance requires enslaved all-round administrations). Such homeless people would, according to Nietzsche,

Good Europeans, the heirs of Europe, the rich, overflowing, but also over-abundantly committed heirs of millennia of the European spirit: as such, also outgrew and averse to Christianity, and precisely because we grew out of it, because our ancestors Christians of ruthless righteousness of the Christianity who willingly sacrificed property and blood, class and fatherland to their faith. (FW 377)

20These are people who can put their own morality and order aside for the sake of other morals and orders, without expecting reciprocity.

21However, they must be “generous and rich of spirit” (FW 378). The “giving” and “giving” that give others the freedom to “create” themselves is also the big theme of Thus spoke zarathustra (all other subjects are assigned to him), and the freedom to giveTo give others leeway of their own freedom is the meaning that Nietzsche gives to freedom. Gift in this sense, as a gift without expectation of a gift in return, without reciprocity, is the noblest virtue in Nietzsche's ethics. It has two prerequisites: on the one hand, the abundance of the spirit, the abundance of opportunities to do justice to others, on the other hand, people who accept such abundance and can do something with it and who in turn are givers or begin to be . Zarathustra does not find such people in his walk among the people, his "downfall". Nietzsche also makes him suffer because of his pity for people who cannot take his gift from him because even the “higher people” cannot get away from the old morality. If there were people who knew how to accept his gift, a new equality and reciprocity would arise among people who give each other the freedom - to give. But Zarathustra remains lonely in Nietzsche's poetry.

22 In the V book of Cheerful science he brings the gift of the ability to give in the image of an “open well on the street”, from which everyone can draw and into which everyone can throw their “rubbish” and which is never empty and always “bright”, its water infinite patience renewed (FW 378) .7 Then he lets a “fool” object that with this “mildness, patience, philanthropy, politeness”, hatred against people is achieved, but not “renunciation of despise”. fine contempt ”that maintains the distance among individuals without turning them against them. And even with this contempt one should be an “artist”, master it with virtuosity - and stand alone with it. This fool seems wise, wise as Nietzsche wants him to be, so wise that he brings up his wisdom as foolishness in order to leave everyone the freedom to accept or not (FW 379).

23And before Nietzsche confirms once again that he “not only wants to be understood”, “but also certainly not to be understood”, namely by those for whom this wisdom is too dangerous, whose “taste [is not] directed towards independence ], to come and go quickly, on a hike, perhaps on an adventure that only the fastest can cope with ”(FW 381), and speaks of his“ great health ”, which made him able to endure even the most severe challenges (FW 382 ), he leaves the "Wanderer", his Hikers out humanly, all-to-humanly close the loop from his moral criticism to his ethics. This arc leads, he lets him say, beyond “our European morality” in order to “get a glimpse of it from a distance, in order to measure it against other, earlier or future morality”, to a “beyond our good and Evil ”, from which also the own“ thoughts about moral prejudices ”- that was the subtitle of the Dawn - can also be seen as “prejudices about prejudices”. But nobody wants to go “there, up there”, the path is too difficult and dangerous, you can only go it if you can got toif you need to do it (FW 380). So in the end it remains in an emergency. But this is now the need from which a new freedom comes, the freedom for other, new morals.